It is universally agreed that the process of gift-giving requires the presence of a gift. Without an object that qualifies as a gift, there is no such thing as an act of giving. Yet this is probably where the agreement ends. Ever since Marcel Mauss published his seminal essay on the gift in the mid-1920s (Mauss 1990 (Mauss [1923 ) sociologists and anthropologists have found it much easier and much more convenient to focus their research on the systems of exchange in which gifts operate, and on the motives that condition gift-giving, than on the object of the gift as such, thus taking their lead from a rather peculiar oversight in Mauss's own work. For as Derrida pointed out in Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money: '[A] work as monumental as Marcel Mauss's The Gift speaks of everything but the gift: It deals with economy, exchange, contract (do ut des), it speaks of raising the stakes, sacrifice, gift and countergift-in short, everything that in the thing itself impels the gift and the annulment of the gift' (Derrida 1992 (Derrida [1991 , 24). The problem of researching and defining what constitutes a gift-object has recently been demonstrated by Aafke E Komter in her empirical study on Social Solidarity and the Gift. Before presenting the results of her work into the patterns and profiles of gift-giving, Komter asks 'What exactly is to be considered as a gift?', to which she responds with the answer:
Using the respondents' own definition of what they experience as a gift is apparently a good approach. However, this would imply another type of research than we had in mind. Because we were mainly interested in the sociological patterns of gift giving and in the psychological motives underlying these patterns, and not primarily in the subjective definitions of "gifts" as opposed to "nongifts," we distinguished several giving objects or giving activities, material as well as nonmaterial: presents, monetary gifts, hospitality (inviting people to dinner or letting them stay in one's house). Our idea was that, in spite of obvious differences between them, practices such as ritual or spontaneous gift giving, offering help or care, or hospitality to other persons have one very essential aspect in common: all these gifts are imbued by the subjective experience of being given out of free will and are not being dictated by any economic rule such as fair exchange or barter. (Komter 2005, 39) Although this passage exemplifies social scientists' inclination to concentrate on the sociological and psychological mechanisms governing practices of exchange, rather than the object of the gift, it nonetheless provides us with at least three interesting angles Whose subjective experience is not entirely clear. It could be the subjective experience of the giver, that of the recipient, or both; 2. The subjective experience which enables the identification of an object as gift is tantamount to its being experienced as the product of a free will, that is to say, the experience rests on an evaluation of the nature of the act (of giving) which carries the object; 3. Gift-objects can be material or immaterial and may cover the entire spectrum from economically valuable goods such as money to exclusively social activities such as hospitality.
One could easily conclude from these ideas that the main reason why the giftobject escapes clear definition is that within a social system of exchange everything (and nothing) can potentially function as a gift, provided the donor, but especially the donee, interprets the object in a certain way. A gift, then, becomes any object that the giver and/or the recipient interprets as a gift. Hence, the object of the gift does not even need to be collapsed onto the (im)material, ostensibly detachable object that is transferred from the donor to the donee, because it may very well coincide with the donor as such. As
Hannibal Lecter would no doubt have said whenever a dinner guest asked him what to bring: 'Just bring yourself!'. Yet if all of this seems plausible, it still does not do justice to the complexity of the object qua gift. For how can any donee (but the same is no doubt true for the donor) ever arrive at the conclusion that an object is given out of free will? How can a recipient (and a giver) determine that an object is not given as part of an economic system of exchange -as a loan, in return for something already received, or perhaps as a payment towards the reduction of an incurred debt. More radically, how can anyone calculate that the given object does not require its return? It is well-known, here, that in Mauss's conception of the gift, the practice of gift-giving cannot be divorced from the principle of do ut des (I give for you to give in return). As Mary Douglas reminded readers in a recent exchange in the Times Literary Supplement, this implies that for Mauss there is no such thing as a 'free' gift, although this fundamental 'contamination' of the gift has never stopped anyone from thinking that a 'true' gift should always be free (Douglas 2005, 15) .
The question as to whether Mauss was correct in arguing that no gift is ever entirely free continues to divide scholarly opinion, and has often generated vehement discussions about the extent to which a human being is capable of relinquishing selfishness in order to express 'real' altruism. Freud (1912-13, 1930a[1929] ) believed that human beings only ever perform unselfish, altruistic acts as a result of their compliance Whichever perspective on 'free' gifts and altruism is closer to the truth, neither of them dispels the fundamental paradox that reigns over the gift-object. If there is no such thing as a 'free' gift, but everyone believes that a gift should be free, then it is not only clear that a genuine gift does not exist, that we can never offer and receive real gifts, but that we are forced to deceive ourselves with the thought that a gift is free in order to be able to give and receive. But if a 'free' gift does exist, if something can really be given for nothing, then the resulting truthful identification of the object qua real gift would in itself reduce its quality, because its sheer recognition as gift will inevitably induce experiences of gratitude (and debt) on the part of the receiver and self-approval (and narcissistic gratification) on the part of the donor. As Alvin Gouldner put it: 'There is no gift that brings a higher return than the free gift . . . For that which is truly given freely moves men deeply and makes them most indebted to their benefactors' (Gouldner 1973, 277) . Remarkably, Gouldner remains reluctant to give up his belief in the existence of the 'free' gift, despite the fact that his assertion clearly indicates that the 'freest' gift is simultaneously the 'unfreest' gift, since it attracts the highest rewards.
Following Derrida in Given Time, the only possible conclusion seems to be that the gift-object is the 'very figure of the impossible':
The simple identification of the gift seems to destroy it. The simple identification of the gift as such, that is, of an identifiable thing among some identifiable 'ones', would be nothing other than the process of the destruction of the gift. It is as if, between the event or the institution of the gift as such and its destruction, the difference were destined to be constantly annulled. At the limit, the gift as gift ought not appear as gift: either to the donee or to the donor. It cannot be gift as gift except by not being present as It is worth noting, here, that Derrida does not exclude the possibility of the social exchange of gifts, whether ritualised or spontaneous, but rather emphasizes the impossibility of an object's continued existence as gift, that is to say as something which does not presuppose or imply a return, from the moment it is identified as such. In other words, an object can only be exchanged as gift for as long as it is not appreciated as a giftobject.
To the best of my knowledge, Derrida does not tease out the implications of his account of the gift-object for the act of giving, nor for the relationship between the giver and the receiver, and the way in which a social system enacts and reproduces patterns of gift-giving. In addition, Derrida builds his argument around the idea that as soon as an object is identified as gift, the gift is annulled because of the effect of restitution that this identification produces, whether in the form of a self-congratulatory, narcissistic gratification (on the side of the donor) or as guilt-ridden gratitude (on the side of the donee). Yet this process of mutual indemnification only works if there is some form of economic equity between the value of the gift-object and the value of the compensatory rewards that it attracts. If the value of the gift-object, or if the cost of the identification of an object qua gift outweighs the profits that it generates, then it is difficult to see how the gift could be annulled. In other words, it seems entirely possible to conceive of the persistence of the gift-object, despite the inevitable force and sum of its returns, if we accept that the value of the gift-object, when it is recognized as such, and the value of its (present or anticipated) effects do not de facto cancel each other out, which is exactly what Derrida seems to assume in his economy of gift-giving. I would even dare to go a step further and propose that it is not so much the gift-object that represents the impossible, but rather the equality of measure between the cost of the gift-object (not its actual financial cost, of course, but the expenditure involved in its perception as gift) and the value of its resultant benefits. The fundamental disparity, the impossible complementarity between the former and the latter is thereby less a function of the actual or attributed weight (personal significance, socio-economic value) that they carry, than of the temporal (and logical) order that separates the two events. The value of the gift-object's resultant benefits may either fall short, or over-indemnify or occasionally match the cost of the object's identification as gift, yet this does not exclude the impossibility of complete complementarity, because the identification of the gift-object will always occur first, as a point of departure, before the occurrence of whatever benefits it attracts. For this reason, I
venture to propose that the gift, apart from being the 'very figure of the impossible', in its unavoidable attraction of returns (which is, in a sense, Derrida's reformulation and radicalisation of Mauss's idea that there is no such thing as a 'free' gift), is also, and perhaps more fundamentally the 'very figure of loss', owing to the temporal impossibility of the cost of the gift-object being annulled by the value of its returns.
What are the implications of this for the act of giving, the relationship between the giver and the receiver, and the way in which a social system enacts and reproduces patterns of gift-giving? If Derrida is right in claiming that the gift is the 'very figure of the impossible', and we accept the aforementioned thesis that the gift is the necessary precondition for the act of giving, then common sense no doubt dictates that the act of giving is equally impossible, at least in its identification as a 'giving act'. But perhaps we must not let ourselves be guided by common sense and be too quick in formulating conclusions. Why would it be impossible to give something that is in itself 'the very figure of the impossible'? Why would the impossible gift-object by definition make the act of giving it into an impossibility? Wouldn't it be possible to conceive of an act of giving that maintains the impossibility of the given object, i.e. that does not de facto presuppose the identification of an object as gift? Wouldn't it be possible to conceive of an act of giving without there being an actual gift?
During the 1950s, Lacan famously defined love as 'giving what you don't have' (Lacan, 2002a (Lacan, [1958 , 243; see also Lacan, 2002b Lacan, [1958 , 276), thereby implicitly borrowing a phrase from Heidegger's discussion of 'The Anaximander Fragment' (Heidegger, 1950 (Heidegger, [1946 ). In this formula, love appears as the epitome of the 'impossible gift', yet at the same time it is by no means impossible to engage in the act of giving it, to actively give someone or something one's love, indeed to make love to someone or to love something. We could even go so far as to say that the act of giving love is essentially predicated upon a refusal or an avoidance of the identification of the object as a gift. If love were to be perceived and ascertained as a gift-object by one or more of the loving parties involved, then the act of loving would instantly be annihilated and re-integrated within an economically sanctioned process of commodification and exchange -reduced to the provision of a social service. The act of loving simply does not tolerate the object of love being identified as a gift, neither by the lover nor by the beloved. The act of loving does not hold up to the beloved responding to the lover's love with the words 'Thank you for that!' However, the possible co-existence of an act of giving and an unidentified giftobject -stronger still, the radical dependency of an act of giving upon the nonidentification of an object as gift -should perhaps not necessarily be restricted to the field of love. And indeed Lacan himself does not appear to have privileged love, here, since he also considered this dynamics to be operative in the passions of hate and ignorance (Lacan, 2002a (Lacan, [1958 , 252). How far the conjunction can be extended beyond the realm of the passions remains to be seen, yet the phenomenon of love demonstrates clearly how the act of giving can be crucially dependent upon the impossibility of the gift-object, on the object of love not being identified as a gift that as such would elicit self-esteem and gratitude. Of course, following Derrida, we also need to acknowledge that the refusal to identify the love-object as a gift is precisely what allows it to persist as a pure, uncontaminated, free gift-object and what makes room for the act of love to be recognized as an act of giving. Again, I believe we could go a step further here and argue that, conversely and paradoxically, it is this type of non-identification of an object qua gift which can make it possible for an act of giving to acquire the connotation of love. The extent to which an act of giving can be experienced as performed with love is inversely lead to the development of stable community life, but to the gradual deterioration of the social fabric into a structure of retaliation, punishment, revenge and outright hostility. The more the town of Dogville shows its acceptance and hospitality by integrating Grace into a mutually agreeable pattern of social transactions, the more Dogville's politics of gift-giving crystallize into a shared, communal and seemingly 'fair' practice of exchanges, the more the town turns itself into an inhospitable, hostile and radically unfair community. The more Dogville's people want respect the more disrespectful they become. The more Grace shows them her 'true face' and offers them her vulnerability, the more they take advantage of it.
The key question, of course, is whether we should read von Trier's provocation as a cynical tale of social inevitability or, less pessimistically, as a representation of social living conditions gone awry. Although I tend to believe that any politics of gift-giving, in light of Jr., the township's 'moral guide', doggedly defends the practice of illustration, whereas Grace Margaret Mulligan, the 'beautiful fugitive', ruthlessly pursues the cause of provocation, despite her ostensible diligence in accepting the trials and tribulations of her fate. We discover at the end of the film that the reason why she ended up in Dogville in the first place is that she had to escape her father's wrath after she had called him 'arrogant'.
Yet later on, when she is working for Dogville's acceptance, she calls Tom 'arrogant', indulges in 'a shady piece of provocation' when forcing Jack McKay to accept his blindness, and surreptitiously provokes Chuck into a state of silent conflict when asking him for forgiveness for not returning his advances. Whereas Tom uses every event to illustrate, and thus to confirm his preconceived ideas about moral rearmament and acceptance, and uses every opportunity to persuade his fellow citizens of his philosophy, Grace presents people with an opportunity to question, re-evaluate and revoke their beliefs about themselves, their neighbours and the community in which they live. In this way, Grace personifies the gift's inexhaustible power to provoke. As a figure of the impossible and loss, the gift-object (and the process of gift-giving supporting it) is able, more than anything else, to destabilise and reorganise existing structures of power, the more so as the act of giving is spontaneous (as opposed to ritualised) and as the gift-giver is a stranger and an outsider (as opposed to a recognized member of an established social unit). Tom's 'mistake' (and the 'mistake' of the entire community of Dogville when they accept and implement his philosophy) is to radically deny the possibility of provocation and to interpret every provocative occurrence ('a force to be taken seriously', as only the dog Moses seems to realise) as a further illustration of what is already known. The result is that belief turns into conviction and that Dogville becomes ever more dogmatic in the affirmation (and acceptance) of its perfidious core.
So it seems that von Trier's fictional tale of the wretched little town of Dogville does leave us with a possibility to escape the grim reality of a social structure that is 
